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PER CURIAM 
   Appellant Frank Robert Chester appeals from an order of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denying in part his federal habeas 
corpus petition.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I. Background and Procedural History 
 Chester and codefendant Richard Laird met the victim, Anthony Milano, a gay 
man, in a bar in Bristol Township, Pennsylvania.  After a night of drinking, the three men 
left together in Milano’s car shortly after the bar closed.  Milano’s bloodied body was 
discovered in a wooded area the next evening.  His skull was fractured and his throat 
slashed.  Laird and Chester were arrested and tried together for first degree murder in 
1988 in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas.  The Commonwealth theorized that 
the murder was motivated by anti-gay bias.  Judge Edward G. Biester, Jr., presided over 
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the trial.  Chester retained, and was represented at trial by, attorney Thomas Edwards, Jr.  
The case was prosecuted by then-District Attorney, and now Court of Common Pleas 
Judge, Alan Rubenstein.  Each defendant took the witness stand and each accused the 
other of the actual killing.  The jury found them both guilty of first degree murder, 
kidnapping, aggravated assault, unlawful restraint, false imprisonment, conspiracy, and 
possession of an instrument of crime.  At the penalty-stage hearing, the jury voted for a 
death sentence, which the trial court imposed.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed 
both criminal judgments in Commonwealth v. Chester, 587 A.2d 1367 (Pa. 1991).  
Chester’s petition for writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court on 
November 12, 1991. 
 On April 17, 1996, Chester, through new counsel, Jeffrey F. Orchard, filed a 
timely petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 9541-46.  It included a claim that Edwards provided constitutionally 
ineffective assistance before and during the trial because of alcohol abuse.  In pursuit of 
this claim, Orchard sought in January 1997 to have the post-conviction judge (Judge 
Biester) unseal Edwards’s 1996 attorney disciplinary suspension record.  Supp. App. 16-
18.  Orchard told the court that he had reason to believe that this record would provide 
information about Edwards’s alcohol problem based on “interviews [he] conducted with 
individuals who are currently members of the bar, were members of the bar at the time, 
… were in Bucks County, [and] were aware of the trial.”  Id. at 18.  The post-conviction 
court denied the request to unseal and, following a hearing, denied the petition.  The 
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, Commonwealth v. Chester, 733 A.2d 1242 (Pa. 
1999), and denied reargument on August 6, 1999.   
 Laird was the first to pursue habeas corpus relief in federal court.  His petition was 
granted in part, the Commonwealth appealed, and we affirmed in Laird v. Horn, 414 F.3d 
419 (3d Cir. 2005).  We held that the general accomplice liability instruction given to the 
jury did not properly instruct it to find specific intent as a prerequisite for accomplice 
liability; that there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in a 
way that relieved the prosecution of establishing that Laird individually had a specific 
intent to kill Milano; and that submission of the instruction to the jury was not harmless 
error.  Laird was granted a new trial.1 
 Meanwhile, on August 16, 1999, only ten days after the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court denied reargument in his PCRA case, Chester filed a pro se motion for 
appointment of counsel, a stay of execution, and leave to proceed in forma pauperis in 
federal court.  Although this motion contained no claims or grounds for relief, it was 
listed on the docket as a habeas corpus petition.   
 On January 11, 2000, current habeas counsel were appointed to represent Chester.  
On April 30, 2001, they filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 
                                              
1 The Commonwealth retried Laird in February 2007.  On retrial, Laird stipulated that he 
murdered Milano “and, hence, the only remaining question for the jury was whether he 
acted with a specific intent to kill, thus making him guilty of first-degree murder.”  
Commonwealth v. Laird, 988 A.2d 618, 624 (Pa. 2010).  The jury found Laird guilty of 
“first-degree murder and set the penalty at death after unanimously concluding that the 
sole aggravating factor outweighed any mitigating circumstances.”  Id.  (In view of the 
kidnapping conviction at the first trial, the parties stipulated to the aggravating 
circumstance that Laird killed Milano in perpetration of a felony.  Id. at 624 n.1.) 
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which was listed on the docket as an amended habeas corpus petition.  It included for the 
first time a claim that Edwards labored under a conflict of interest because he was facing 
a criminal charge -- specifically, driving under the influence (hereinafter, “DUI”) in the 
Bucks County Court of Common Pleas at the same time that he was representing Chester 
in his capital murder trial in the same jurisdiction.  Chester contended that Edwards failed 
to disclose the conflict to him; that the trial judge knew or should have known of the 
conflict and failed to ask whether Chester wished to proceed with conflict-free counsel; 
and that the District Attorney knew of and failed to disclose the conflict.  Habeas counsel 
requested an evidentiary hearing and stated that the investigation that uncovered the DUI 
began with their interview of Laird’s trial counsel Ronald Elgart in December 2000.  
Elgart subsequently submitted an affidavit dated December 13, 2000, in which he stated 
that Edwards had a number of DUI arrests following the trial.  This affidavit led current 
habeas counsel to investigate the Bucks County criminal docket in January 2001, and that 
is when they discovered Edwards’s 1988 DUI arrest and prosecution. 
 Chester’s federal petition was stayed while he pursued the unexhausted conflict-
of-interest claim and claim of newly discovered evidence in a second state PCRA petition 
in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas.  The post-conviction judge (again Judge 
Biester) denied the petition as untimely filed under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9545(b)(1).  
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed that ruling.  Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 
A.2d 520, 524 (Pa. 2006).  In short, the state courts determined that Chester could have 
obtained Edwards’s 1988 DUI arrest and conviction records much sooner than January 
2001.    
6 
 
 The stay in Chester’s federal habeas case was lifted in 2006.  The Commonwealth 
submitted an answer to Chester’s petition in October of that year.  In the “Argument” 
section of the answer, it contended that the conflict-of-interest claim was barred due to a 
procedural default, citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), and that Chester 
could not show cause and prejudice or actual innocence.  Within the “Argument” section 
of the answer, the Commonwealth’s first heading stated: “I.  Petitioner’s Attempt to 
Reopen the Alleged Trial Counsel’s ‘Conflict of Interests’ Argument is Timebarred 
and Subject to Collateral Estoppel.”  Supp. App. 84 (emphasis in original).  Under this 
heading, the Commonwealth argued that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and state post-
conviction judge had “already determined” that Chester’s conflict of interest claim was 
timebarred, albeit under the PCRA.  Id.  The Commonwealth referred to the timeliness 
issue as “already adjudicated,” id., and then followed with a discussion of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s analysis of the after-acquired evidence and governmental 
interference exceptions in a state statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9545(b)(1)(i) and (ii).  
Supp. App. at 85.  On the merits, the Commonwealth argued that there was no actual 
conflict, that the District Attorney had no duty to disclose Edwards’s pending DUI, and 
that, because Edwards did not alert the trial judge to the existence of the DUI, the judge 
was under no obligation to ask whether Chester wished to proceed with different counsel. 
 On August 19, 2009, about three years later, Chester’s habeas counsel moved for 
the habeas writ to issue immediately based on our decision in Laird, 414 F.3d 419.  In 
addition, they indicated their intent to pursue only two guilt-phase claims: the conflict-of-
interest claim and a severance claim.  The District Court scheduled oral argument for the 
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purpose of narrowing the issues, at which time the Commonwealth conceded that Chester 
was entitled to the same relief on the defective accomplice liability instruction that Laird 
had received -- a new trial limited to the charge of first degree murder.  Habeas counsel 
then argued three specific issues: why the conflict-of-interest claim was not barred due to 
a procedural default and also two issues concerning the merits of the claim.  The 
Commonwealth argued the merits of the claim; the “question of Williams v. Taylor and 
whether the prisoner was diligent in his efforts;”2 and whether the conflict claim was 
“procedurally defaulted.” 
 In an order entered on February 28, 2011, the District Court vacated Chester’s first 
degree murder conviction and death sentence without prejudice to the Commonwealth’s 
right to retry him.  Chester v. Horn, 2011 WL 710470 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2011).  The 
Commonwealth has not appealed this decision.  Prior to addressing Chester’s request for 
a habeas evidentiary hearing, the District Court addressed and rejected as meritless the 
Commonwealth’s argument that the conflict-of-interest claim was barred due to a 
procedural default, holding that our decision in Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700 (3d Cir. 
2005), effectively precluded the Commonwealth’s argument.3  The District Court granted 
                                              
2 In Williams, the Supreme Court held that diligence under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), the 
evidentiary hearing statute, did not require an investigation of public records where the 
prosecutor failed to disclose that he had previously represented the foreperson of the jury.  
529 U.S. 420, 440-42 (2000). 
 
3 Pennsylvania’s PCRA statute of limitations was not firmly established nor regularly 
applied until November 23, 1998, at the earliest, when Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 
A.2d 693 (Pa. 1998), which announced that the “relaxed waiver” doctrine no long applied 
in capital post-conviction appeals, was decided.  Bronshtein, 404 F.3d at 709-10.  
Chester’s default occurred on January 16, 1997, the PCRA’s “grace period” filing 
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Chester an evidentiary hearing on his conflict-of-interest claim, see 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(e)(2),4 and further determined that de novo review of the conflict claim was 
warranted. 
 At this stage of the habeas proceedings, all guilt-phase and sentencing claims 
relating to Chester’s first degree murder conviction and death sentence were moot 
because of the Commonwealth’s concession that a new trial was in order on the murder 
charge, but all guilt-phase claims (that is, the severance and conflict-of-interest claims) 
relating to the remaining convictions were not.  On October 28, 2011, the District Court 
limited discovery solely to Edwards’s DUI arrest and prosecution; the court denied any 
discovery with respect to his other personal problems.  On January 20, 2012, Judge Alan 
Rubenstein gave a deposition.  In it he acknowledged that he was aware of Edwards’s 
DUI arrest at the time of Chester’s trial because someone on his staff told him about it.  
He testified that Edwards himself never mentioned his DUI arrest and never mentioned 
that he was applying for the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition program (“ARD”), a 
diversion program of pretrial probation for qualified first-time offenders.  App. 104.  He 
                                                                                                                                                  
deadline for those whose convictions became final before the state statute of limitations 
was enacted.  Because the date of Chester’s default predated Albrecht, the federal habeas 
procedural bar does not apply here and there is thus no need to undertake a cause-and-
prejudice analysis.  
 
4 As explained by the District Court, the history of the conflict-of-interest claim in this 
case -- it was raised for the first time in an untimely second state post-conviction petition, 
but the default of the claim occurred during the state’s “relaxed waiver” era -- is identical 
to the history of the conflict-of-interest claim in Morris v. Beard, 633 F.3d 185, 196 (3d 
Cir. 2011), and therefore Morris controls.  In Morris, we held that, where a state court 
gives no reason for denying a petitioner’s hearing request other than his failure to comply 
with an inadequate state procedural rule, we could not say that the petitioner lacked 
diligence for purposes of § 2254(e)(2). 
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testified that Edwards was a strong advocate for Chester, that he was well-prepared, and 
that, if he was not actually aggressive, it was because he was trying to “low-key” 
Chester’s participation in the murder.  Id. at 111-12.  Judge Rubenstein testified that it 
never occurred to him that Edwards’s DUI arrest posed a conflict of interest, see id. at 99-
100, 106, and that other members of his staff handled the DUI prosecution, see id. at 105.    
 Chester’s habeas counsel tendered an affidavit dated February 14, 2012, which 
bore what purported to be Edwards’s signature and which stated that he had been arrested 
for DUI while representing Chester at trial.  It said that the charge was of “great concern” 
to him.  Id. at 118.  The affidavit also stated that Edwards was “scared” that he would not 
get ARD; that his wife was dying from multiple sclerosis, and because of this it was 
difficult for him to try Chester’s case, as his “mind was someplace else during trial.”  Id.  
The affidavit stated: 
My wife’s condition, my pending criminal charges, and other financial 
difficulties I was having right then all interfered with my abilities in the 
courtroom.  I was drinking more at this time.  Mr. Chester’s case was, for 
me, an incredibly difficult case to try with all this going on in my life.  For 
one thing, if I could do it all over again, I would have been more aggressive 
in contesting what Alan Rubenstein was doing in court and I would have 
cross-examined Richard Laird.  I believe my personal issues caused me not 
to do those things.  I’m sure there were other things I would have done 
differently, but I just don’t recall anything specific now.  I just remember 
that as a result of the combination of difficulties in my life at the time, I did 
not represent Mr. Chester as well as I know I could have….  I self-
medicated [a flare-up of my post-traumatic stress disorder] by drinking 
more, and this occurred during Mr. Chester’s trial. 
 
Id. at 118-19. 
 The District Court held a hearing on September 6, 2012.  Prior to that, the District 
Court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to preclude the testimony of several 
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witnesses, including Laird’s counsel.  App. 116.  Edwards testified via video conference.  
He reiterated generally that his wife’s illness was devastating to him and that he was self-
medicating his post-traumatic stress disorder with alcohol at the time of Chester’s trial.5  
But when asked directly by habeas counsel if his pending DUI and other problems were 
distracting, he replied “No.”  Id. at 165.  Habeas counsel then sought to impeach Edwards 
with the affidavit.  Edwards would have none of it, and denied that he ever signed it.  Id. 
at 171.   
 On the subject of plausible alternative trial strategies, Edwards did admit that use 
of Laird’s prior convictions would have been helpful in establishing that Laird was a liar 
and that he might have missed this.  Id. at 214.  But in the main Edwards testified that he 
“was very aggressive during the trial.”  Id. at 216.  On cross-examination, Edwards 
testified that he did not fail to do anything he should have done as a result of a fear that 
he would not get ARD, that he did not do anything differently because he feared the 
District Attorney, and that he did not fear not getting ARD because the DUI was his first 
offense.  Id. at 217-18.  The District Court then questioned Edwards and asked him if his 
pending DUI caused him to be less zealous in his representation of Chester; he replied 
that “it did not.”  Id. at 219.  It asked him if all of his other personal problems caused him 
to “lay down” against the Commonwealth in his representation of Chester, and he replied 
that “[n]othing could be further … from the truth.”  Id.  It also asked him if all of the 
pressure that he was under caused him not to give his best effort in representing Chester, 
and he replied in the negative.  Id. at 220.   
                                              
5 Edwards’s PTSD stems from his service during the Vietnam War. 
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 On May 22, 2013, the District Court determined that the conflict-of-interest claim 
was meritless.  Chester v. Horn, 2013 WL 2256218 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2013).  The Court 
noted first that, in addition to arguing a conflict claim based on the DUI charge pending 
against Edwards in the same jurisdiction, Chester was also arguing a separate conflict 
claim based on Edwards’s personal financial struggles, legal battles (including liens and 
civil lawsuits), post-traumatic stress disorder flare-up, and his wife’s illness, at the time 
of Chester’s trial.  This latter conflict claim, in the District Court’s view, was meritless 
because an attorney’s personal problems generally are insufficient to show a potential 
conflict.  Id. at *4 n.6.  On the other hand, Edwards’s pending DUI could be considered a 
potential conflict that adversely affected his performance.  The District Court then 
applied our decisions in United States v. Gambino, 864 F.2d 1064 (3d Cir. 1988), and 
Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125 (3d Cir. 1984), and found this 
conflict claim lacking in merit because Edwards’s actions on Chester’s behalf were 
unaffected by the DUI or the desire to curry favor with the District Attorney.  The 
District Court held that Chester had failed to show that the pending DUI charge against 
Edwards caused him to change his trial strategy adversely and/or not employ certain 
methods in his trial strategy that should have been employed.  The Court took into 
consideration that a DUI offense, in which the standard punishment is entry into a 
rehabilitative treatment program, cannot be compared to more serious offenses in which 
the possibility of a career-ending conviction rests in the hands of a zealous prosecutor. 
 The District Court further held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in 
failing to ask Chester if he wished to proceed with different counsel.  It reasoned that 
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Chester was found guilty and sentenced to death on May 20, 1988, but it was not until 
June 7, 1988 that Edwards was formally charged in the Court of Common Pleas.  While 
Chester’s post-trial motions were still pending when Edwards pleaded not guilty to the 
DUI, the District Court emphasized that, unlike the circumstances in Zepp, the charge 
Edwards faced was wholly unrelated to Chester’s case.  Moreover, under the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, defense counsel is in the best position to determine if a 
conflict exists, and Edwards did not disclose his potential conflict to the trial judge.  
Regarding the affidavit and Edwards’s in-court testimony “recanting,” the Court agreed 
with the Commonwealth that the affidavit constituted inadmissible hearsay under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 803.  But the Court also went on to say that it “had the opportunity to 
assess Mr. Edwards’s demeanor and testimony firsthand,” and, “[a]t the end of the day, 
nothing [Chester] has provided … establishes that a conflict of interest existed….  The 
existence of potentially different trial strategies that might have been employed by 
counsel is not enough.”  Chester, 2013 WL 2256218, at *5.  In a later decision, the 
District Court determined that the severance claim lacked merit.  Chester v. Horn, 2013 
WL 5565510 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 2013). 
II. Analysis6 
 Chester timely appealed and sought a certificate of appealability in this Court on 
the conflict-of-interest claim only.  We granted the certificate but also directed the parties 
                                              
6 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).  AEDPA deference does 
not apply in this case and we review the District Court’s denial in part of habeas relief de 
novo.  Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).  We review the Court’s 
factual findings for clear error.  Id. 
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to brief whether the conflict claim was timely filed under the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).  The matter has been briefed and 
argued and is now ripe for disposition.  We have considered the timeliness issue but 
ultimately rest our decision on the merits.  In any event, we will affirm. 
A. Timeliness Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) 
 The conflict-of-interest claim’s untimeliness is apparent to us from the record and 
arguments.  The one-year limitations period began to run in Chester’s case when the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied reargument on August 6, 1999 on appeal from the 
denial of his first PCRA petition.  The AEDPA statute of limitations went into effect on 
April 24, 1996.  Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1998).  At that time, 
Chester’s timely first PCRA petition was still pending in the Bucks County Court of 
Common Pleas.  This “properly filed application” tolled the running of the limitations 
period.  28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).  Because of the statutory tolling, the one-year limitations 
period did not begin to run in Chester’s case until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
denied reargument on August 6, 1999.  Therefore, Chester had until August 6, 2000 to 
file a timely habeas corpus petition or amendment containing a conflict-of-interest claim 
based on his trial counsel’s 1988 DUI arrest and prosecution.  There were no claims or 
grounds for relief at all raised in the August 16, 1999 filing.  The conflict-of-interest 
claim based on trial counsel’s DUI arrest and prosecution was not raised until the April 
30, 2001 filing, almost eight months after the AEDPA deadline expired.  Accordingly, 
regardless of whether the April 30, 2001 petition is considered the original or amended 
petition, the conflict-of-interest claim was untimely filed under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A).  
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 The timeliness of a claim based on newly discovered evidence is judged under 28 
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D).  Cf. Fielder v. Varner, 379 F.3d 113, 118-22 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(AEDPA statute of limitations applied on a claim-by-claim basis).  For a petitioner 
asserting a claim based on newly discovered evidence, the limitations period will begin to 
run on “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could 
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.”  28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D).  
Here it appears that there was ample time in which to discover Edwards’s 1988 DUI 
arrest and prosecution and bring a conflict-of-interest claim based on it prior to the 
August 6, 2000 deadline.  Chester’s first PCRA petition included a claim that Edwards 
provided constitutionally ineffective assistance before and during the trial because of 
alcohol abuse.  In pursuit of this claim, his post-conviction counsel sought to unseal 
Edwards’s 1996 attorney disciplinary suspension record, Supp. App. 16-18, and told the 
post-conviction judge in open court that he had reason to believe that this record would 
provide information about Edwards’s alcohol problem based on “interviews I conducted 
with individuals who are currently members of the bar, were members of the bar at the 
time, … were in Bucks County, [and] were aware of the trial,” id. at 18.  In short, the 
information that would have led to discovery of Edwards’s 1988 DUI arrest and 
prosecution is contained in the record of the first PCRA proceeding, and, in our view, 
there existed in 1997 just as much reason to investigate Edwards’s DUI history -- either 
by interviewing Laird’s trial counsel or by searching the criminal docket, or both -- as 
there was when current habeas counsel conducted their investigation in December 2000 
and January 2001.   
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 Of course, the AEDPA statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling in 
appropriate cases, Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010), but a petitioner must 
show both that: (1) he has been pursuing his rights diligently; and that (2) some 
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented him from timely filing his 
claim.  Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).  Even if the District Attorney 
neglected an ethical obligation to disclose the potential conflict at the time of the trial 
(and we do not decide nor imply that he did), Chester would still have to show that he 
pursued his rights diligently, and it seems to us rather plain that he did not.  Id. 
 Nevertheless, a habeas respondent may waive a procedural defense, even a 
meritorious one.  “A waived claim or defense is one that a party has knowingly and 
intelligently relinquished….”  Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1832 n.4 (2012) (citing 
Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 458 n.13 (2004)).  In Wood, the state twice informed the 
District Court that it would not challenge, but was not conceding, the timeliness under 
AEDPA of the petitioner’s habeas petition.  132 S. Ct. at 1832.  The Supreme Court held 
that, under those circumstances, the state was aware of the defense but had intelligently 
chosen not to rely on it, and, thus, the federal appeals court had no authority to override 
the deliberate waiver.  Id. at 1834.  In its answer to Chester’s petition, the 
Commonwealth argued that the conflict-of-interest claim was barred due to a procedural 
default, see Coleman, 501 U.S. 722, because the state PCRA’s time bar is independent 
and adequate, and that Chester could not show cause and prejudice or actual innocence.  
In making this argument, the Commonwealth never mentioned the AEDPA statute of 
limitations defense under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 
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 On the other hand, the Commonwealth also stated in a heading that Chester’s 
“attempt to reopen” the conflict-of-interest argument was “time-barred and subject to 
collateral estoppel,” Supp. App. 84, and that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and state 
post-conviction judge had “already determined” that Chester’s conflict-of-interest claim 
was timebarred, albeit under the state PCRA, id.  It further highlighted those Courts’ 
discussion of the after-acquired evidence and governmental interference exceptions, 42 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9545(b)(1)(i) and (ii), and their conclusion that these exceptions 
did not apply because Edwards’s DUI arrest was a matter of public record and could have 
been discovered at the time of Chester’s first PCRA petition.  Supp. App. 85.7  
 Because the Commonwealth attempted to argue that the conflict claim was 
untimely (hence procedurally defaulted), though not under the statute that actually applies 
in federal habeas corpus proceedings, we cannot conclude that the Commonwealth was 
aware of the defense but intelligently chose not to rely on it.  Wood, 132 S. Ct. at 1834.  
There was no mention of the AEDPA statute of limitations, but the repeated references to 
the conflict claim being timebarred lead us to conclude that the Commonwealth’s 
decision not to rely on AEDPA stemmed from inadvertent error and not a concession or 
deliberate choice.  We thus hold that the Commonwealth did not waive the AEDPA 
statute of limitations defense.   
                                              
7 The state PCRA exceptions to timeliness are similar (although not identical) to the ones 
provided by AEDPA.  In Pennsylvania, any petition invoking these exceptions must be 
filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 9545(b)(2), whereas a federal habeas petitioner has one year in which to file a 
petition based on newly discovered evidence or the removal of a state-created 
impediment, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B) and (D). 
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 That does not end our analysis, however.  Indeed, we hold that the 
Commonwealth’s defense was forfeited.  The Supreme Court recognizes a distinction 
between “waiver” and “forfeiture” of timeliness claims, Wood, 132 S. Ct. at 1832 n.4.  
“Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the 
‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’”  United States v. Olano, 
507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).  Here, 
the Commonwealth failed to preserve the timeliness argument by not addressing directly 
the AEDPA statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).  Although there was ample 
discussion of timeliness, the Commonwealth steered the District Court toward the 
procedural default argument that the state PCRA’s time bar is independent and adequate.  
The Commonwealth conceded at oral argument before us -- as indeed the record requires 
-- that it pursued only the procedural default argument.   
 We explained in United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2013), that there 
are “at least two characteristics that identical arguments always have.  First, they depend 
on the same legal rule or standard.  Second, the arguments depend on the same facts.”  Id. 
at 342 (citations omitted).  The Commonwealth’s procedural default argument simply 
does not depend on the same legal standards and facts as an argument that Chester’s 
conflict-of-interest claim was not timely filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).  Moreover, 
at no time did the Commonwealth identify the key facts necessary to establish the 
AEDPA timeliness defense -- that Chester’s conviction became final when the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied reargument on August 6, 1999; that Chester had 
until August 6, 2000 in which to file a timely habeas corpus petition or amendment 
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containing a conflict-of-interest claim based on the fact of his trial counsel’s 1988 DUI 
arrest and prosecution; and that the conflict claim was not raised until the April 30, 2001 
filing, almost eight months after the AEDPA deadline expired.  The Commonwealth has 
noted that it specifically argued before the District Court on March 22, 2010 that Chester 
had not been diligent in his efforts to learn of Edwards’s DUI arrest and that he could 
have discovered it well before he filed his second PCRA petition.  See Appellees’ Brief at 
44-45.  But that argument was made solely in the context of whether Chester had been 
diligent in developing a factual basis for his claim in state court, as required by 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(e)(2), the habeas evidentiary hearing statute.  Again, this argument is not the same 
as a timeliness argument under § 2244(d)(1).  An AEDPA timeliness defense necessarily 
includes a discussion of when the petitioner’s judgment of conviction became final, and a 
calculation of a specific date by which time the petitioner must have filed his § 2254 
petition or amendment containing the claim at issue.  That argument was completely 
missing here and thus the defense is forfeited. 
 Although we may “resurrect” a forfeited defense (but not a waived one), Wood, 
132 S. Ct. at 1833 n.5; see also id. at 1834 (“[W]e decline to adopt an absolute rule 
barring a court of appeals from raising, on its own motion, a forfeited timeliness 
defense.”), the Supreme Court has cautioned that we may do so only in exceptional cases.  
We must respect “the principle of party presentation basic to our adversary system.”  Id. 
at 1833 (citing Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243-44 (2008)).  In addition, 
“[w]e must give due regard for the trial court’s processes and time investment,” because 
“[w]hen a court of appeals raises a procedural impediment to disposition on the merits, 
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and disposes of the case on that ground, the district court’s labor is discounted and the 
appellate court acts not as a court of review but as one of first view.”  Id. at 1834.  In 
order to resurrect the Commonwealth’s forfeited timeliness defense in Chester’s case, we 
would have to disregard the principles of party presentation basic to our adversary system 
and the District Court’s hard work in this case.  We see no reason for doing this.  The 
Commonwealth had many years to address AEDPA timeliness and never did.  
Accordingly, we decline to resurrect the Commonwealth’s forfeited AEDPA timeliness 
defense.   
B. Merits 
 Turning to the merits, as a threshold matter we note that on direct appeal Chester 
argued a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness claim concerning Edwards’s decision to forgo 
cross-examining Laird.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the claim on the 
ground that Laird was adequately cross-examined by the District Attorney.  The Court 
reasoned that Laird never wavered from blaming Chester, that further cross-examination 
would not have revealed any information tending to exculpate Chester, and that Edwards 
could reasonably have concluded that further cross-examination of Laird would have 
been “useless.”  Chester, 587 A.2d at 1383.  Chester’s current conflict-of-interest claim, 
although it is supported by many of the same facts as the ineffectiveness claim, is 
analytically distinct.  Compare Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 1984) (to 
establish constitutionally inadequate representation a defendant must prove that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different), with Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50 
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(1980) (“Sullivan”) (defendant who shows that conflict of interest actually affected 
adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief).  
 A defendant is entitled under the Sixth Amendment to conflict-free representation.  
In Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that a defendant must establish that an actual conflict 
of interest adversely affected his counsel’s performance.  446 U.S. at 349-50.  State trial 
courts must investigate counsel’s timely objections to multiple representation, but if 
counsel does not object, courts need not make that inquiry.  The Court stated that, unless 
the trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict of interest 
exists, the trial court may assume that counsel will discharge his ethical duty to avoid 
conflicting representations and to advise the court promptly when a conflict arises.  Id. at 
346-47.  In Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 164 (2002), the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to address “what a defendant must show [in a case involving prior 
representation] in order to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation where the trial court 
fails to inquire into a potential conflict of interest about which it knew or reasonably 
should have known.”  The Court held that, except in cases involving multiple concurrent 
representation where the risk of prejudice is high, an “‘actual conflict of interest’ mean[s] 
precisely a conflict that affected counsel’s performance – as opposed to a mere 
theoretical division of loyalties.”  Id. at 171 (emphasis in original).  We note that 
Chester’s case does not involve either multiple representation or prior representation, but 
the Sullivan/Mickens principles still guide our analysis of the theoretical division of 
loyalties issue presented here. 
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 We agree with the District Court that Chester’s conflict claim lacks merit because 
he failed to show that the pending DUI charge against Edwards caused him to change his 
trial strategy adversely and/or not employ certain methods in his trial strategy that should 
have been employed.  Chester argues first that the District Court erred in requiring “strict 
proof,” Appellant’s Brief at 41, of an actual conflict in the form of a concession from 
Edwards that his conflict caused an adverse effect on his performance; that all he 
(Chester) needed to prove was that an adverse effect was likely; and that there were 
plausible alternative strategies for defending Chester that Edwards ignored.  At oral 
argument, Chester’s counsel asserted that the District Court had applied the wrong 
standard.  After setting forth the correct standard -- that Chester must demonstrate an 
actual conflict of interest that adversely affected his defense -- the District Court quoted 
Gambino for the incorrect proposition that, “[t]o succeed in this claim, the ‘lapse in 
representation’ must be ‘so egregious as to violate objective standards for attorney 
performance.’”  Chester, 2013 WL 2256218, at *4. 
 Despite a misquotation from Gambino, see infra n.8, the District Court properly 
applied the correct standard and our decision in Gambino when it determined that the 
conflict-of-interest claim lacked merit because Edwards’s actions on Chester’s behalf 
were unaffected by the DUI.  In Gambino, we explained that an actual conflict of interest 
occurs when “the defendants’ interests diverge with respect to a material factual or legal 
issue or to a course of action.”  864 F.2d at 1070.  Relying on the decision of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in United States v. Fahey, 769 F.2d 829 (1st 
Cir. 1985), we said that, in order to prove an actual conflict, the petitioner must show: (1) 
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that some plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic might have been pursued; and 
(2) that the alternative defense was inherently in conflict with or not undertaken due to 
the attorney’s other loyalties or interests.  Id. (citing Fahey, 769 F.2d at 836).  With 
respect to the issue of a plausible alternative defense, we explained that the defense need 
only possess sufficient substance to be plausible.  Gambino, 864 F.2d at 1070.  We 
further stated that, “[c]learly, a defendant who establishes that his attorney rejected a 
plausible defense because it conflicted with the interests of another client establishes not 
only an actual conflict but the adverse effects of it.”  Id. at 1070-71. 
 The District Court applied this standard.  It correctly observed that the pending 
DUI had the potential to cause Edwards to “pull his punches” in defending Chester.  
Chester, 2013 WL 2256218, at *3.  It then required Chester to prove that a different trial 
strategy should have been pursued but was not because of Edwards’s divided loyalties.  
Id. at *5; see also Gambino, 864 F.2d at 1070 (petition must show alternative strategy 
was not pursued because of conflict) (citing Fahey, 769 F.2d at 836).  While it is true, as 
habeas counsel argued before us, that Gambino holds only that the plausible alternative 
defense possess sufficient substance to be a viable alternative, and that the District Court 
misattributed to Gambino some language to the contrary,8 we are not persuaded that the 
mistake identified by counsel led the Court to apply the wrong standard.  When the 
Court’s opinion is read as a whole, it is clear that it applied the correct standard. 
                                              
8 In Hess v. Mazurkiewicz, 135 F.3d 905 (3d Cir. 1998), we said in applying Gambino 
that a petitioner “need not show that the lapse in representation was so egregious as to 
violate objective standards for attorney performance,” 135 F.3d at 910 (emphasis added).  
The District Court, in quoting Hess (but attributing the quote to Gambino), left out the 
crucial “not,” Chester, 2013 WL 2256218, at *4. 
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 Chester argues that the following constitute plausible alternative strategies that 
Edwards failed to pursue: (1) he did not cross-examine Laird; (2) he failed to impeach 
Laird with his criminal record; (3) he selected pro-death jurors; (4) he failed to introduce 
evidence that Laird was the sole killer and the only one with a motive to kill Milano; (5) 
he did not seek admission of toxicology evidence showing that Milano was drunk; and 
(6) he did nothing to elicit from Chester, using his prior statements, that he had no intent 
to kill Milano.  Notwithstanding whether these alternative tactics were desirable, or even 
necessary, Chester would still have to show that they were not pursued because of 
Edwards’s divided loyalties.   
 Chester has not made this showing.  There is no record support for his assertion 
that Edwards’s performance at trial was affected by his desire to curry favor with the 
District Attorney or that he chose to “lay down” against the Commonwealth in his 
representation of Chester.  Although there may have been plausible alternative strategies 
for defending Chester, none of them was inherently in conflict with Edwards’s desire to 
be placed in ARD and avoid imprisonment.  Specifically, even if Edwards should have 
used Laird’s prior convictions to impeach him, Chester failed to show that this alternative 
tactic was inherently in conflict with or not undertaken due to Edwards’s pending DUI.   
 The cases cited by Chester in support of his conflict claim involve obvious 
connections between the conflict and the questionable trial tactics, and, accordingly, do 
not support his claim for relief.  In Zepp, we held that there was an actual conflict of 
interest because “trial counsel could have been indicted for the same charges on which he 
represented Zepp, and … trial counsel was a witness for the prosecution.”  748 F.2d at 
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136.  We explained that “trial counsel had equal access and opportunity while alone in 
the house with Zepp to flush cocaine down the toilet.  It is clear that he was potentially 
liable for aiding and abetting or encouraging the destruction of evidence.”  Id.  Similarly, 
in Rugiero v. United States, 330 F. Supp.2d 900, 907-09 (E.D. Mich. 2004), trial counsel 
was under investigation by the U.S. Attorney for extortion and money laundering, and he 
had an incentive to avoid plea negotiations on behalf of his client, who was charged with 
drug trafficking, because he feared that his client had information that could be used 
against him; counsel sought to prolong the trial in hopes of delaying or avoiding his own 
indictment.  Here, in contrast to Zepp and Rugiero, Edwards was charged with a DUI that 
was unrelated to the murder of Milano.  
 Chester also maintains that the District Court erred in excluding at the hearing 
evidence of Edwards’s other personal problems, including evidence relating to his ill 
wife, his pre-existing PTSD, his unpaid taxes, and his severe financial problems.  The 
Court declined to admit this evidence, deciding that a separate conflict-of-interest claim 
based on Edwards’s other personal problems was legally insufficient to show a potential 
conflict.  It did not err in excluding this evidence.  It was in the best position to determine 
if there was anything “unique and unprecedented,” Appellant’s Brief at 64, about 
Edwards’s personal life at the time of trial, and its implied finding that there was not is 
not clearly erroneous.  Gambino, 864 F.2d at 1071 n.3.   
 Chester next argues that the District Court failed to consider (1) Edwards’s alleged 
“admissions,” Appellant’s Brief at 65, that his pending DUI and other personal problems 
adversely affected his performance at the trial, and (2) that the February 14, 2012 
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affidavit was substantive evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 807.  As a threshold 
matter, because Chester’s separate conflict-of-interest claim pertaining to Edwards’s 
other personal problems is legally insufficient, his argument concerning how Edwards’s 
testimony on these issues should have been weighed need not be considered.  The 
argument was properly disregarded by the District Court in rendering its decision.   
 With respect to the conflict-of-interest claim based on Edwards’s DUI arrest and 
prosecution, we conclude that the District Court did not clearly err in weighing the 
evidence, including the February 14, 2012 affidavit.  The Court was entitled to rely on 
Edwards’s in-court testimony that his challenged tactics were the result of strategy and 
not a conflict of interest.  Id. at 1071-72.  In any event, the Court did not rely exclusively 
on Edwards’s in-court testimony about his performance in deciding the conflict-of-
interest claim.  It was but one of many factors considered.  The Court also had the 
opportunity to view Edwards’s demeanor and consider his answers to habeas counsel’s 
questions.  In addition, the Court gave habeas counsel free reign in impeaching Edwards 
with the affidavit.  Although the Court concluded that the affidavit was inadmissible 
hearsay -- and the “question a habeas court must ask when presented with hearsay is not 
whether it is admissible, since it is always admissible, but what probative weight to 
ascribe to whatever indicia of reliability it exhibits,” Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 
879-81  (D.C. Cir. 2010), -- ultimately it found that Edwards’s in-court testimony, and 
not the affidavit, was credible.  We cannot say that the District Court clearly erred in this 
respect.  Chester has argued that Edwards’s disavowal at the § 2254 hearing of the 
signature on the affidavit was “ludicrous,” Appellant’s Brief at 75, but the Court did not 
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make any specific finding regarding the validity of the affidavit and signature.  It simply 
exercised its ultimate authority as the factfinder to give weight to Edwards’s in-court 
testimony.  There was nothing improper about doing so.     
 Finally, Chester contends that the District Court erred in denying relief on the 
claim that the state trial judge failed to comply with his independent duty to ask about the 
conflict.  The only circumstance in which Supreme Court precedent requires that a 
conviction be automatically reversed as a result of a trial court’s failure to ask whether 
the defendant wishes to proceed with conflict-free counsel is where counsel is forced to 
represent codefendants and objects to that representation.  Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168 
(citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978)).  Though the record shows that 
post-trial motions on behalf of Chester were still pending before the trial judge when the 
judge authorized Edwards’s admission into the ARD program, Chester, 2013 WL 
2256218, at *1, Chester is not entitled to relief on an argument that the trial judge failed 
to inquire into the potential conflict unless he can establish that an actual conflict 
adversely affected Edwards’s performance.  This was the holding of Mickens, and it 
applies here because this is not a conflict claim involving multiple concurrent 
representation. 
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court denying in 
part Chester’s federal habeas corpus petition. 
